As I recall, the Taliban were essentially drawn from the Pashtun tribes which at 30% are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. A fair number, but hardly the overwhelming majority you appear to initially claim. And I would guess tribal loyalty would come a long way before any notion of Nationality.Burke's dismissal of their knowledge of Islam is puzzling in the subsequent light of their very strict interpretation of Sharia Law.


I'm not sure of the point you're making here. Surely it is within the wit of the Nato Commanders to broker a localised deal with whatever blend of Taliban supporter has the most influence in the district?


Really? and what snappy, easily understood one word would you offer up to describe the aformentioned?


Oh, I'd say the relationship between the Taliban and AQ was a lot more than simply accomodating. Again,there is evidence that in the first instance, the Taliban offered to hand over BL to the Pakistani Authorities, who declined. There were other attempts by the Taliban, eager to avert the gathering storm, by offering him (with conditions) to America, who also declined, no doubt secure in their ability to secure their military objectives.


I wonder where you get your figures on civilian casualties from? For those more interested in FACTS than rhetoric

As I recall, the Taliban were essentially drawn from the Pashtun tribes which at 30% are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. A fair number, but hardly the overwhelming majority you appear to initially claim. And I would guess tribal loyalty would come a long way before any notion of Nationality.Burke's dismissal of their knowledge of Islam is puzzling in the subsequent light of their very strict interpretation of Sharia Law.


I'm not sure of the point you're making here. Surely it is within the wit of the Nato Commanders to broker a localised deal with whatever blend of Taliban supporter has the most influence in the district?


Really? and what snappy, easily understood one word would you offer up to describe the aformentioned?


Oh, I'd say the relationship between the Taliban and AQ was a lot more than simply accomodating. Again,there is evidence that in the first instance, the Taliban offered to hand over BL to the Pakistani Authorities, who declined. There were other attempts by the Taliban, eager to avert the gathering storm, by offering him (with conditions) to America, who also declined, no doubt secure in their ability to secure their military objectives.


I wonder where you get your figures on civilian casualties from? For those more interested in FACTS than rhetoric

I said the overwhelming majority (as opposed to foreign nationals who join for various reasons) are indigenous.



Burke is saying they have little knowledge of the Islamic world outside of Afghanistan. Which is in line with his argument that they have little to no internationalist agenda.



I'm saying we need to get away from this concept of a monolithic Taliban. Over the past twelve months the military appears to have embraced this idea (to an extent).



I wouldn't.



As I said, the Taliban were grateful for Bin Laden's assistance during the war. Or at least certain elements of them were as there is a division between those that fought the Russians purely for reasons of self-determination and those who were ideological warriors sponsored by Bin Laden, the Saudis etc.

But as Burke says, there is very little evidence the Taliban care about much beyond Afghanistan.



I notice you don't include Iraq. And as HRW says - it can only determine a fraction of the true figures in a dangerous country such as Afghanistan. And, of course, no mention is made of the number of people who've died as a result of, say, starvation fleeing the violence. Especially as Afghanistan is currently experiencing one of the worst droughts in its history (one of the reasons opium production has sky-rocketed, I should add)

I said the overwhelming majority (as opposed to foreign nationals who join for various reasons) are indigenous.



Burke is saying they have little knowledge of the Islamic world outside of Afghanistan. Which is in line with his argument that they have little to no internationalist agenda.



I'm saying we need to get away from this concept of a monolithic Taliban. Over the past twelve months the military appears to have embraced this idea (to an extent).



I wouldn't.



As I said, the Taliban were grateful for Bin Laden's assistance during the war. Or at least certain elements of them were as there is a division between those that fought the Russians purely for reasons of self-determination and those who were ideological warriors sponsored by Bin Laden, the Saudis etc.

But as Burke says, there is very little evidence the Taliban care about much beyond Afghanistan.



I notice you don't include Iraq. And as HRW says - it can only determine a fraction of the true figures in a dangerous country such as Afghanistan. And, of course, no mention is made of the number of people who've died as a result of, say, starvation fleeing the violence. Especially as Afghanistan is currently experiencing one of the worst droughts in its history (one of the reasons opium production has sky-rocketed, I should add)

Absolute rubbish. 'The people of Afghanistan' are around 29.8 million multi-ethnic and multi-lingual Afghans, including 2.7 million refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and consisting of different groups such as Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimak, Turkmen, Baloch, etc

The Taliban is an Islamist militant and political group made up of predominantly Sunni Muslim Pashtuns, and opposed by Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, and Turkmen. They are not 'the people of Afghanistan'. They are 'some people of Afghanistan' who are not positively supported by the majority of the population. It's a bit like calling The English Defence League, 'the people of England'.

As for their origins and interests, I don't believe I ever said otherwise.


No, there's not a good argument for that at all, given their well documented and well organised history. Such a 'hopelessly indefinite conceptual creation' could never have waged an efficient campaign that saw them take swathes of the country and finally Kabul. That they and they supporters may be currently fragmented due to foreign forces in their midst is irrelevant. The movement still has its clearly defined leaders and determinations and immediately the West leaves, they will reform into a more definite group.


Bin Laden was incredibly familiar with the Taliban - of course he was, he fought with and financed many of them as part of the Mujahideen. The Taliban, as the de facto government, were stuck between reigning Al Qaeda in and building international relations, but given a choice between the infidel West/Great Satan and loyalty to a fellow Islamist group, Al Qaeda was always going to win. Regardless of differing outside interests.

And yes, it's true the Taliban offered to hand Bin Laden over (with conditions) - but this was done very reluctantly, and there's no evidence they weren't simply stalling for time, especially in 2001 when they knew a storm was definitely coming yet they still tried to negotiate and make deals. Plus at all times they had the ISI in the background snapping at their heels and working to their own agenda.

On the ground many Taliban (especially foot soldiers and those not in the top echelons of power) disliked Al Qaeda simply because Al Qaeda were mainly Arabs who threw their weight and money around. Indeed, there were indications around 2005 that even Al Qaeda was going through a split along these lines as Central Asian AQ began to severely resent Arab AQ, who had been hiding on their patch for years, yet treating it as their own.


That is true. But whether NATO forces wish to fight the Taliban or not, they are being attacked by them on a daily basis. The legal justification kind of takes a back seat when Taliban mortars are landing in the dunny and Taliban IEDs are so prevalent, and when Taliban fighters are throwing their weight and intimidating locals as soon as NATO forces are out of sight.


Smart munitions are incredibly smart, but they're only as accurate as the person aiming them. We want 'our boys' safe from harm's way and out of the firing line, yet we baulk at the inevitable consequences of firing munitions on the basis of long-range drone/aircraft footage. We can't have it both ways.

As rumplestiltskin already posted, you seem to avoid the facts. And I'm not sure why you brought up Iraq in your response to him, when your statement concerned 'casualty rates quoted by various independent organisations for Afghanistan'.


The war, to all intents and purposes, was won. The Taliban had been deposed, Al Qaeda all but destroyed, their financial backing wiped out, the central figures sent into hiding. The mistake we made was not to kill Bin Laden early on at Tora Bora when we made the mistake of trusting an Afghan warlord and his militia to support the operation, when instead they shied away from danger and instead let so many slip the net.

Our Western mindset is so fragile we recoil from the thought of absolutely ruthless action and the risk of TV footage of body bags. We're also obsessed with 'rebuilding', as if Afghanistan was in a pristine state before 9/11. If we'd really wanted to finish the job what should have happened was thousands of troops dropped along the borders, the mountain passes and roads secured, strike forces dropped in Al Qaeda hotspots, the Taliban wiped out and Al Qaeda encircled and destroyed. Job done, out we get, leave them to it. Yet we are so sensitive to media exposure and press disapproval we set unrealistic limitations on our armed forces and expect the world - and that's why we've ended up in the quagmire.

As it happens, we might have just been handed to perfect exit strategy. Karzai wants Western forces out of rural areas and a quicker transfer of power to the Afghan army, and the Taliban aren't talking. Fine, give them what they want and get out. They can get back to their usual tribal and Islamist in-fighting.

The only guarantee is that Afghanistan will get a lot worse and the West will kop the blame for the next 50 years, whatever happens.

Absolute rubbish. 'The people of Afghanistan' are around 29.8 million multi-ethnic and multi-lingual Afghans, including 2.7 million refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and consisting of different groups such as Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimak, Turkmen, Baloch, etc

The Taliban is an Islamist militant and political group made up of predominantly Sunni Muslim Pashtuns, and opposed by Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, and Turkmen. They are not 'the people of Afghanistan'. They are 'some people of Afghanistan' who are not positively supported by the majority of the population. It's a bit like calling The English Defence League, 'the people of England'.

As for their origins and interests, I don't believe I ever said otherwise.


No, there's not a good argument for that at all, given their well documented and well organised history. Such a 'hopelessly indefinite conceptual creation' could never have waged an efficient campaign that saw them take swathes of the country and finally Kabul. That they and they supporters may be currently fragmented due to foreign forces in their midst is irrelevant. The movement still has its clearly defined leaders and determinations and immediately the West leaves, they will reform into a more definite group.


Bin Laden was incredibly familiar with the Taliban - of course he was, he fought with and financed many of them as part of the Mujahideen. The Taliban, as the de facto government, were stuck between reigning Al Qaeda in and building international relations, but given a choice between the infidel West/Great Satan and loyalty to a fellow Islamist group, Al Qaeda was always going to win. Regardless of differing outside interests.

And yes, it's true the Taliban offered to hand Bin Laden over (with conditions) - but this was done very reluctantly, and there's no evidence they weren't simply stalling for time, especially in 2001 when they knew a storm was definitely coming yet they still tried to negotiate and make deals. Plus at all times they had the ISI in the background snapping at their heels and working to their own agenda.

On the ground many Taliban (especially foot soldiers and those not in the top echelons of power) disliked Al Qaeda simply because Al Qaeda were mainly Arabs who threw their weight and money around. Indeed, there were indications around 2005 that even Al Qaeda was going through a split along these lines as Central Asian AQ began to severely resent Arab AQ, who had been hiding on their patch for years, yet treating it as their own.


That is true. But whether NATO forces wish to fight the Taliban or not, they are being attacked by them on a daily basis. The legal justification kind of takes a back seat when Taliban mortars are landing in the dunny and Taliban IEDs are so prevalent, and when Taliban fighters are throwing their weight and intimidating locals as soon as NATO forces are out of sight.


Smart munitions are incredibly smart, but they're only as accurate as the person aiming them. We want 'our boys' safe from harm's way and out of the firing line, yet we baulk at the inevitable consequences of firing munitions on the basis of long-range drone/aircraft footage. We can't have it both ways.

As rumplestiltskin already posted, you seem to avoid the facts. And I'm not sure why you brought up Iraq in your response to him, when your statement concerned 'casualty rates quoted by various independent organisations for Afghanistan'.


The war, to all intents and purposes, was won. The Taliban had been deposed, Al Qaeda all but destroyed, their financial backing wiped out, the central figures sent into hiding. The mistake we made was not to kill Bin Laden early on at Tora Bora when we made the mistake of trusting an Afghan warlord and his militia to support the operation, when instead they shied away from danger and instead let so many slip the net.

Our Western mindset is so fragile we recoil from the thought of absolutely ruthless action and the risk of TV footage of body bags. We're also obsessed with 'rebuilding', as if Afghanistan was in a pristine state before 9/11. If we'd really wanted to finish the job what should have happened was thousands of troops dropped along the borders, the mountain passes and roads secured, strike forces dropped in Al Qaeda hotspots, the Taliban wiped out and Al Qaeda encircled and destroyed. Job done, out we get, leave them to it. Yet we are so sensitive to media exposure and press disapproval we set unrealistic limitations on our armed forces and expect the world - and that's why we've ended up in the quagmire.

As it happens, we might have just been handed to perfect exit strategy. Karzai wants Western forces out of rural areas and a quicker transfer of power to the Afghan army, and the Taliban aren't talking. Fine, give them what they want and get out. They can get back to their usual tribal and Islamist in-fighting.

The only guarantee is that Afghanistan will get a lot worse and the West will kop the blame for the next 50 years, whatever happens.